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Luke Pelicant
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
In March of 2006, journalist David Perera reported on the potential for
Chinese hackers to break into the Department of Defense's Non-classified
Internet Protocol Router Net (NIPRNet),' the network that provides
communications services among various commands and branches within the
military2 This could be done, Perera wrote, to stifle the American response to a
potential invasion of Taiwan
At an Air Force Information Technology Conference just a few months
later, then Major General William Lord told his audience "China has
downloaded 10 to 20 terabytes of data from the NIPRNet."4 He suggested these
attempts were aimed at acquiring data to allow hackers clandestine access to
the network in the future, and called the issue "a nation-state threat by the
Chinese."'
Cyber-espionage threats are growing.' According to Army General Keith
J.D., LL.M., August 2011. The author would like to thank his thesis advisor, Marvin
Ammori, and Maj. Erik Mudrinich, USAF, for insight and feedback in the completion of
this article.
' DSIN Data Services, http://commcns.org/L31uPR.
2 David Perera, The Great Wall, Gov'T EXEC. MAGAZINE (Mar. 1, 2006),
httF://commcns.org/JNRzPt.
Id.
4 Patience Wait, Chinese Seek Military ID Info, GOVERNMENT COMPUTER NEWS (Aug. 15,
2006), http://commcns.org/L3lsHE. See also Richard A. Clark, Introductory Remarks to
Directors' Seminar at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (Sept. 14,
2010) (comparing the amount of data stolen to the equivalent of a digitized Library of
Congress), http://commcns.org/JiD3Cd.
Wait, supra note 4.
6 See generally JAMES LEWIS, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT'L STUDIES, SIGNIFICANT
CYBER ATTACKS SINCE 2006 (last modified Jan. 19, 2012), http://commcns.org/KTnDmc.
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Alexander, Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, "DOD systems are probed
by unauthorized users approximately 250,000 times an hour, over 6 million
times a day."' However, another estimate from Chief Information Assurance
Officer for the Department of Defense Robert Lentz suggests the number is
actually closer to 360 million probes per day.' With regard to federal
government systems more generally, attacks on those systems in 2010
increased thirty-nine percent from the previous year.' The United States is by
no means the sole target of these efforts-the United Kingdom,o France," and
South Korea 2 are among the more recent targets of cyber-espionage.
Moreover, certain countries have been publicly identified as perpetrators of
this conduct."
The threat posed by cyber-espionage will continue to develop, but debate
exists as to how the United States can adequately address it. Following this
introduction, the article briefly examines the cyber-espionage phenomenon
with particular attention paid to major events over the last five years. The
following section surveys international and U.S. law on espionage and draws
on the work of scholars to suggest a less alarmist view of espionage generally.
In particular, this article concludes that cyber-espionage, like any other form of
espionage, is permissible under international law. The next section focuses on
the consequences of espionage in the cyber domain and how, despite its
notoriety, it should be recognized as a valuable tool for countries in promoting
international stability. Lastly, the article reviews the tools that are at the
government's disposal in dealing with cyber-espionage, and examines
proposals made by scholars to address this method of intelligence gathering.
General. Keith Alexander, Dir., Nat'l Sec. Agency, Cybersecurity Policy and the Role
of U.S. CyberCom, Address Before the Center for Strategic and International Studies (June
3, 2010), available at http://commcns.org/Lfyavb.
Declan McCullagh, NSA Chief Downplays Cybersecurity Power Grab Reports, CNET
(Apr. 21, 2009), http://commcns.org/MobuYP.
Elizabeth Montalbano, Federal Cyber Attacks Rose 39% in 2010, INFORMATIONWEEK
(Mar. 23, 2011), http://commcns.org/JOEqAw.
1o Richard Norton-Taylor & Julian Borger, Chinese Cyber-spies Penetrate Foreign Office
Computers, GUARDIAN (UK), Feb. 4, 2011, http://commcns.org/Kw5aOv.
1 Max Colchester & Gabriele Parussini, France Investigates Attack on Computers,
MARKET WATCH (Mar. 7, 2011), http://commcns.org/LWN3iu.
12 Song Sang-ho, China Stole South Korean Secrets on Drone: Lawmaker, KOREA
HERALD (Mar. 7, 2011), http://commcns.org/Jj7r0p.
13 Chinese Hackers Target Government Computers, THE LOCAL (Dec. 27, 2010),
http://commens.org/J2BggP (discussing Germany accusing China of hacking its government
systems); Agency Admits Spying on Afghan Politician and SPIEGEL Journalist, SPIEGEL
ONLINE-INTERNATIONAL (Apr. 24, 2008) http://commcns.org/KjfPrC (reporting on
Germany admitting its espionage aimed at an Afghan minister).
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B. Definitions
This paper addresses cyber-espionage, also known as "cyber-exploitation,"
defined by Herbert Lin as "the use of actions and operations-perhaps over an
extended period of time-to obtain information that would otherwise be kept
confidential and is resident on or transiting through an adversary's computer
systems or networks.""
Action through cyber-exploitation is generally covert and is conducted
though the least intrusive means in order to extract the sought-after
information." Individuals who engage in cyber-exploitation attempt to leave
undisturbed the normal operations of a computer system or network, and an
ideal method is one that goes undetected by the user."
Cyber-espionage can be contrasted with other forms of cyber activities.
Such activities include "cyberterrorism" or full-on "cyberwar", both of which
could have devastating effects, as compared to others that are less severe in
nature, such as low-level "cybercrime" or "cybervandalism."" The technical
aspects of these activities complicate the determination of whether cyber-
espionage is merely espionage or whether it is something more a daunting task
for federal regulators and those tasked with defending our networks.
One technique that can be utilized is system probing, which consists of
gathering valuable intelligence while causing no damage to the network. Dr.
Herbert Lin of the National Research Council analogizes such activity to
approaching a country's airspace without violating it to engage in observations
from the air and to test the countries air defense response." This type of
behavior alone, although typically regarded as unfriendly, would not normally
raise any use of force concerns." If a method of cyber-espionage is the use of
such a payload, even if it is designed not to result in any harm to the host
system, the host country will not necessarily have that knowledge and could
perceive the payload as a harmful threat.20
Indeed, probing can be a precursor to something far more destructive,
14 Herbert S. Lin, Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY
L. & POt'Y 63, 63 (2010).
15 Id. ("Cyberexploitations are usually clandestine and conducted with the smallest
possible intervention that still allows extraction of the information sought.").
16 Id. at 63-64.
1 Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Cyberwar: Concept, Status Quo, and Limitations, CTR. FOR
SECURITY STUDIES, 1-2 (2010), http://commcns.org/j2Bi8r (discussing the different
categories of cyber-exploitation and the limitations involved in controlling them).
18 See Lin, supra note 14, at 79. See also Section IV, infra.
I9 Id.
20 Lin addresses these and other difficult questions relating to cyber-espionage. Lin, supra
note 14, at 82-84.
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illustrated by the Russian-Georgian crisis of 2008.21 While there have been
many more examples of pure cyber-espionage activities that have not served as
staging for a subsequent attack, government and military officials must
nonetheless consider the possibility that a systematic probing and incursion
onto sensitive systems could be such a preparatory measure.22
Dr. Lin also provides an example in which an "offensive cyber operation"
deploys a dual purpose payload into the computer network of an adversary.2 3
The payload's first role is merely data observation and collection, activity that
falls under the espionage category. The second role is to neutralize the system
upon command.24 Whether the deployment of such a payload amounts to
espionage or rises to the level of the threat or use of force is a difficult question
to resolve.
The Stuxnet worm presents an example of the potential for this type of dual-
payload system, though the worm was not employed for espionage purposes.
Stuxnet first gained public attention in June of 2010 by researchers in Belarus,
who observed its presence on computers belonging to their Iranian clients.25
Stuxnet's purpose was to disable centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment
Plan in Iran by manipulating industrial control equipment developed by
Siemens.26 Stuxnet raises significant questions for policymakers and may
represent the future of cyber operations.
C. Recent Incidents of Cyber-Espionage
In addition to the NIPRNet example above, other incidents help to illustrate
exactly the range of cyber-espionage threats countries face.
21 David Hollis, Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008, SMALL WARS JOURNAL 4 (2011),
http://commcns.org/Jm6cXB. See also discussion on Russia, infra Section IlI.C.
2 Christopher Bronk, Blown to Bits: China's War in Cyberspace, August-September
2020, STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY 18 (2011), http://commcns.org/LauaG1 (discussing
comprehensive cyberespionage campaign conducted prior to broader cyberattack).
23 An offensive cyber operation serves to introduce "an upgradeable software agent into
an adversary system." This agent engages in cyberexploitation and operates destructive
action, such as destroying read-only memories that control the boot sequence of machines.
Lin, supra note 14, at 78-79.
24 See Lin, supra note 14, at 79.
25 Kim Zetter, Surveillance Footage and Code Clues Indicate Stuxnet Hit Iran, WIRED
(Feb. 16, 2011), http://commcns.org/KoyQsM; David Albright, Paul Brannan & Christina
Walrond, Stuxnet Malware and Natanz: Update of ISIS December 22, 2010 Report,
INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 1-2 (2011),
http://commcns.org/JiD3Ce.
6 Paul K. Kerr, John Rollins & Catherine A. Theohary, The Stuxnet Computer Worm:
Harbinger of an Emerging Warfare Capability, CONG. RES. SERV. 1 (2010),
http://commcns.org/JNRATu; David Albright, Paul Brannan & Christina Walrond, Stuxnet
Malware and Natanz: Update of ISIS December 22, 2010 Report, INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 1-2 (2011), http://commcns.org/JiD3Ce.
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In the fall of 2007 British authorities announced that various government
systems had been penetrated by hackers. The London Telegraph reported that
the hackers were associated with the People's Liberation Army of China and
that the hackers had targeted up to ten departments, including the Foreign
Office and Home Office.2 One expert characterized the conduct as occurring
over a period of years, and that it fit within "a new doctrine of the PLA
described as 'pressure point warfare'-the attacking of specific nodes to leave
the adversary paralyzed."28 Attempts to gain access to British government
systems have continued, and have led to calls by Foreign Secretary William
Hague for the adoption of "acceptable rules" for nation state behavior in the
cyber realm.29
Halfway across the world in 2008, the Indian government announced that it
was the target of cyber-espionage activities. The Times of India reported that
Indian systems had suffered daily beaches, allegedly by the Chinese, for over a
year and a half30 Officials indicated that while hacking is a common
occurrence, the type conducted by the Chinese was "far more sophisticated and
complete," aimed at not only gleaning content from the systems but also
discerning vulnerabilities for future exploitation in the event of a broader
conflict." The Times of India article was met with some skepticism,32 and the
Chinese government unsurprisingly denied the accusations, going so far as to
suggest other countries may be using Chinese systems to carry out such
attacks." While many countries treat attacks like those suffered by India as
"security breaches," the Indian government considers them on par with
"Internet-based terrorist attacks."34 India has continued to experience
exfiltration of sensitive information through cyber-espionage, including data
27 Christopher Hope & David Blair, Chinese Hackers 'Hit 10 Whitehall Departments',
THE TELEGRAPH, Sept. 6, 2007, http://commcns.org/KbLmfq.
28 Richard Norton-Taylor, Titan Rain - How Chinese Hackers Targeted Whitehall, THE
GUARDIAN, Sept. 4, 2007, http://commcns.org/JylNrB (quoting Alex Neill, head of the Asia
Security Programme at the Royal United Services Institute).
29 Charles Arthur, William Hague Reveals Hacker Attack on Foreign Office in Call for
Cyber Rules, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 5, 2011, http://commcns.org/JSlshX.
30 Indrani Bagchi, China Mounts Cyber Attacks on Indian Sites, TIMES OF INDIA (May 5,
2008), http://commcns.org/KjfPHS.
31 Senior governmental officials publicly declare "hacking" to be a routine activity that
inflicts many nations, yet they privately acknowledge the severe cyberwar threat faced by
China in particular. See id
32 Richard Steinnon, The Indian Front in the Chinese Cyber War, STEINNON ON SECURITY
-NETWORK WORLD (May 6, 2008), http://commens.org/JNRATx (suggesting that the attacks
on India were merely part of China's global espionage efforts).
3 Chinese Official Denies Government Hand in Cyber Attacks, THAINDIAN NEWS (May 5,
2008), http://commcns.org/JNRzPz.
34 Shamshur Rabb Kahn, China's Cyber Warfare, INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT
STUDIES, Article No. 2597 (June 16, 2008) available at http://commcns.org/JylNrC.
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related to defense systems."
Private industry is not immune from this type of conduct either and
often presents a ripe target for cyber spies. In April of 2009, the Wall Street
Journal reported that hackers were able to access computer systems containing
data on the Joint Strike Fighter project, stealing "several terabytes of data
related to design and electronics systems."" It was suspected that computer
systems used by contractors on the project had been breached over a period of
years, and former officials indicated China was likely the culprit behind the
intrusions." That same day, however, Pentagon officials and Lockheed Martin,
the affected contractor, downplayed the story, claiming that the Wall Street
Journal article misrepresented the facts.38
The following month, hackers broke into the Homeland Security
Information Network, an unclassified but nevertheless sensitive data sharing
system utilized by the Department of Homeland Security and state and local
authorities." Administrative data files-including "telephone numbers and
email addresses"-were apparently the only files accessed,4 0 even though this
seemingly innocuous data could be used for other espionage efforts.4 1
The most recent and noteworthy incident of cyber-espionage involved a
major intrusion into the computer systems of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF).4 2 While officials' initial statements were muted, they later disclosed that
the breach was "sophisticated" and "involved significant reconnaissance prior
to the attack."4 3 Investigators have since indicated that the intrusion was
"linked to a foreign government," and resulted in a major loss of data."
3s Government Carefully Looking into Hacking of Sensitive Data, INDIA TODAY (Apr. 8,
2010), http://commcns.org/KbLmfr. A 2010 Shadows in the Cloud Report, developed by the
Information Warfare Monitor and Shadowserver Foundation, discusses in greater detail the
continued espionage efforts aimed at Indian government systems. STEVEN ADAIR, ET AL.,
SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD: INVESTIGATING CYBER ESPIONAGE 2.0 JOINT REPORT: INFORMATION
WARFARE MONITOR, SHADOWSERVER FOUNDATION (2010).
36 Siobhan Gorman, August Cole, & Yochi Dreazen, Computer Spies Breach Fighter-Jet
Pr W ect, Wall Street J. (Apr. 21, 2009), http://commcns.org/JSlsi2.
Id.
38 Jim Wolf, Lockheed Says F-35 Classified Data Not Breached, REUTERS (Apr. 21,
2009), http://commcns.org/Lau80r.
39 Ben Bain, Information-Sharing Platform Hacked, FEDERAL COMPUTER WEEK (May 13,
2009), http://commcns.org/Lfyavd.
40 Id.
41 Shane Harris, Chinese Spies May Have Tried to Impersonate Journalist Bruce Stokes,
WASHINGTONIAN (Jan. 28, 2011), http://commcns.org/JVA7uf (discussing an incident of
spear phishing).
42 David E. Sanger & John Markoff, I.MF. Reports Cyberattack Led to 'Very Major
Breach, 'N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2011), http://commcns.org/KTnDmg.
43 Sudeep Reddy, Siobhan Gorman & Evan Perez, IMF Mum on Details of Network
Cyberattack, WALL ST. J. (June 13, 2011), http://commcns.org/J2Bi8x.
4 Michael Riley & Sandrine Rastello, IMF State-Backed Cyber-Attack Follows Hacks of
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These incidents demonstrate the prevalence of cyber-espionage, the wide
range of information that can be stolen, and the resulting impetus on states to
not only defend against these intrusions but also develop the means to conduct
them. The following section provides some insight into how countries are
gearing up to operate in the cyber realm.
II. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. Sources of International Law
J.L. Brierly defined international law as "the body of rules and principles of
action which are binding upon civilized states in their relations with one
another."45 As John Perkins observed, "[i]nternational law develops in response
to an inexorable logic of international relations. It is imposed by the realities
of foreign policy. The roots of the law and of its legitimacy lie in this
dynamic."4 6
The Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that the court shall
consider four sources to decide cases.4 7 These include treaties, "whether
general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
states;" custom, consisting of opinio juris and general practice; "general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations;" and "judicial decisions and
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations."4
Given the dearth of treaties and judicial decisions on the matter of peacetime
espionage, the works of learned publicists serve an important role in
addressing legal issues relating to espionage.
National laws, on the other hand, largely govern the conduct of states within
their internal borders. Thus, when analyzing the legality of peacetime state-
sponsored cyber-espionage, it is important to recognize the dynamic between
national laws and international law, and how that can influence the conduct of
states.
B. International Law Regarding Cyber-Espionage
Disagreement abounds as to whether peacetime espionage is permissible
Lab, G-20, BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2011), http://commcns.org/Kil8pB.
45 J. L. Brierly, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
PEACE I (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963).
46 John A. Perkins, The Changing Foundations ofInternational Law: From State Consent
to State Responsibility, 15 B.U. INT'L L. J. 433, 456 (1997).
47 See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38 (1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055
(1945).
48 Id.
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under international law.49 Interestingly, international law has not evolved to
address the finer aspects of the question-this has been the case during the
height of the Cold War and even into the 21st century.so
Support for the permissibility of peacetime espionage under international
law extends as far back as the 17th century to the writings of Grotius," a major
figure in the development of modem international law." Though espionage
conducted in wartime has received attention in international law, in particular
the laws governing armed conflict," peacetime espionage has not.54 According
to Roger Scott, "[e]spionage is not prohibited by international law as a
fundamentally wrongful activity; it does not violate a principle of jus
cogens."" Ajus cogens norm is defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties as "a norm accepted and recognized by the international community
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character."56 Consequently, a prohibition of or limitation on
peacetime espionage is largely governed by the domestic laws of nations."
This view most comports with reality given the nature of statecraft and
geopolitical necessities. As one scholar observed, "there has never been a war
49 A. John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law, 28
MICH. J. INT'L L. 595, 602 (2007).
5o See id. ("[T]raditional international law is remarkably oblivious to the peacetime
practice of espionage. Leading treatises overlook espionage altogether or contain a
perfunctory paragraph that defines a spy and describes his hapless fate upon capture."
(quoting Richard A. Falk, Foreword to ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, at
v (Roland J. Stranger ed., 1962)).
51 Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
321, 331 (1996). See also HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, INCLUDING THE
LAW OF NATURE AND OF NATIONS 331 (Cosimo, Inc. 2007) (1901) ("As the law of nations
permits many things, in the manner above explained, which are not permitted by the law of
nature, so it prohibits some things which the law of nature allows. Thus spies, if discovered
and taken, are usually treated with the utmost severity. Yet there is no doubt, but the law of
nations allows any one to send spies, as Moses did to the land of promise, of whom Joshua
was one.").
52 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The Role of International Law in the Twenty-First Century: A
Grotian Moment, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1609, 1609 (1995).
53 See e.g., Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex:
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 29-31, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277. See also Dieter Fleck, Individual and State Responsibility for Intelligence
Gathering, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 687, 689 (2007); Demarest, supra note 51, at 334-35.
54 Demarest, supra note 51, at 330.
ss Roger D. Scott, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International Law,
46 A.F. L. REV. 217, 218 (1999). See also Fleck, supra note 54, at 688.
56 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
To this author's knowledge, peacetime espionage has not been explicitly banned under any
international judicial decisions or treaties.
5 Demarest, supra note 51, at 330. See also Sean P. Kanuck, Information Warfare: New
Challenges for Public International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 272, 276 (1996).
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without spies, and there never has been a peace in which spies have not
engaged in preparations for a future war."" Espionage serves a critical purpose
in enabling states to acquire information on allies and enemies alike,
information that may be difficult to discover through more conventional
means. This information in turn allows states to effectively navigate the rough
currents of international relations and preserve their individual security.
Despite having its share of supporters, the position that peacetime espionage
is illegal under international law is ultimately misguided. Professor Radsan
cited Manuel Garcia Mora's claim that "peacetime espionage is regarded as an
international delinquency and a violation of international law,"" though Mora
himself acknowledged the point is thoroughly contested.60 Richard Falk argued
espionage is illegal, but noted there is "considerable persuasive policy
available to oppose" that conclusion."
Quincy Wright, in a piece on espionage and aerial reconnaissance in
peacetime, contended they were illegal, noting "both are illegitimate
enterprises because they manifest a lack of respect for foreign territory."62
Wright was referencing the 1960 incident in which the Soviets shot down
American pilot Francis Powers as he flew over the U.S.S.R. in a U-2 spy
plane.6 3 Given the lack of clarity pertaining to espionage in international law,
as evidenced by this incident and the related development of technologies, the
1960-61 regional meeting of the American Society of International Law
("ASIL") chose espionage as its focus.' Out of that meeting came a collection
of writings entitled, "Essays on Espionage and International Law," which serve
as the lens through which this Article examines the phenomenon of cyber-
espionage.
Two authors from this collection of works are Quincy Wright and Julius
Stone. Called "a founding father" in the academic field of international
relations," Wright wrote extensively on the subject and taught for many years
58 Richard A. Falk, Foreword to ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, at v
(Roland J. Stranger ed., 1962) (quoting Kurt D. Singer, THREE THOUSAND YEARS OF
ESPIONAGE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF THE WORLD'S GREATEST SPY STORIES vii (1948)).
s9 Radsan, supra note 49, at 604 (quoting Manuel Garcia Mora, Treason, Sedition and
Espionage as Political Offenses Under the Law of Extradition, 26 U. PITT. L. REV. 65, 79-80
(1964)).
6o Manuel Garcia Mora, Treason, Sedition and Espionage as Political Offenses Under the
Law ofExtradition, 26 U. PITT. L. REV. 65, 80 n.78 (1964). See also Ingrid Delupis, Foreign
Warships and Immunity for Espionage, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 53 (1984); Myres S. McDougal et
al., The Intelligence Function and World Public Order, 46 TEMP. L. REV. 365 (1973).
65 Falk, supra note 58, at 45, 79-80 n.28.
6 Quincy Wright, Legal Aspects of the U2 Incident, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 836, 849 (1960).
63 Id. at 836-37.
64 Falk, supra note 58, at viii.
65 Inis L. Claude, The Heritage of Quincy Wright, 14 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 460, 461
(1970).
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at the University of Chicago.66 Wright's contribution to the ASIL meeting
reflected much of what he had written on the U-2 incident. He emphasized that
such conduct amounted to a "violation of the rule of international law
imposing a duty upon states to respect the territorial integrity and political
independence of other states."" He further wrote, "[i]n principle, all peacetime
espionage in foreign territory is illegal," conceding that "when all are engaging
in it, it seems unreasonable to single out one state for utilizing a particular form
of espionage, even though that form carries possibilities of hostile action going
beyond espionage.""
In contrast to Wright's conclusions, Julius Stone took a more pragmatic
view of peacetime espionage under international law. Stone taught at the
University of Sydney for thirty years, focusing on jurisprudence and
international law, and is widely considered to have been "one of the premier
legal theorists."6 9 He strongly advocated for the establishment of a hotline
between the governments of the U.S.S.R. and the United States during the
Cold War, a tool crucial for the nuclear age as well as the cyber age." With
respect to this topic, Stone contested Wright's condemnation of aerial
espionage during peacetime as illegal under international law, undertook his
own analysis of the matter, and ultimately concluded that, absent any collateral
illegality, no prohibition on peacetime espionage exists."
He began by positing "a view of espionage which transcends that of
traditional international law," one born out of the Cold War stand-off that
could benefit both sides of that divide.72 Stone contrasted his era of
technological revolution with the period over which the laws of espionage
evolved, where communication was largely conducted "face to face, or by
physical writing, by carriage, on foot, or on horseback.""
Stone analyzed espionage at a time in which the world witnessed the
utilization of sophisticated radio communication and satellite technology,
along with high altitude surveillance aircraft.74 He observed how this
technological growth altered espionage and the types of information sought by
See generally William T.R. Fox, "The Truth Shall Make You Free": One Student's
Apereciation of Quincy Wright, 14 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 449 (1970).
Quincy Wright, Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs, in
EsSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 12 (Roland J. Stranger ed., 1962).
68 Id. at 21.
69 About Professor Julius Stone, U. SYDNEY L. SCH., http://commcns.org/Ja6dmE (last
visited Apr. 15, 2012).
70 Id.
Julius Stone, Legal Problems of Espionage in Conditions of Modern Conflict, in
ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 29, 34 (Roland J. Stranger ed,. 1962).
72 Id. at 31.
7 Id. at 36-37.
74 Id. at 37.
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countries." Stone cautioned that "our very survival now depends on being
contemporaneous in our thinking, and not pretending that we can either govern
or preserve ourselves in a transformed world, by the use of notions no longer
applicable."" To that end, he recognized that espionage would evolve to
depend on means such as satellite reconnaissance or sea-based surveillance,
which would diminish collateral illegality like territorial intrusion."
Stone's underlying argument rested in the context of the Cold War. He
argued that the failure to achieve an inspection regime for the United States
and U.S.S.R. meant that such information needed to be acquired by some other
means, and the imperfect solution was reciprocal espionage." He argued that
"a good system of international inspection must be basically a system of
reciprocal espionage, with a seal of international umpireship on it."" Thus,
without an officially accepted system in place, the only recourse to stave off
disaster is mutually tolerated reciprocal espionage."
Stone conceded that this approach posed difficulties. If one were to accept
his premise, a major obstacle would be distinguishing between what he termed
"red light" and "green light" espionage." Red light espionage is the sort which
"served the common-interest function" of espionage and would give warning
of the spied-upon state's preparation for an impending surprise attack.82 Green
light espionage, on the other hand, serves "the divisive and destructive
function" in offering the spying state knowledge that the spied-upon state was
vulnerable to a first-strike, thus inviting an attack." Whether each country
would only conduct "red light espionage" and how other states could verify
this is an issue under his framework on which he did not elaborate.
Stone's view has some modern descendants. Christopher Baker fixes
espionage in functional roots, arguing that espionage facilitates state
cooperation and ultimately international security.84 Baker premises his
argument on the idea that treaty enforcement methods, namely verification and
assurance measures, are limited in their ability to accomplish their stated
purposes." He points to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and how
its procedure allows for states to take precautions prior to scheduled
75Id.
"Id. at 38.
7 See Stone, supra note 71, at 34.
7 1Id. at 40-41.
79 Id. at 41-42.
o Id. at 42.
81 Id.
82 id.
83 See Stone, supra note 71, at 42-43.
8 Christopher D. Baker, Tolerance of International Espionage: A Functional Approach,
19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1091, 1091-92 (2004).
8 Id. at 1102-03.
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inspections and thus obscure the extent of their treaty compliance."
As a result, Baker sees espionage as a back-up measure of sorts for building
cooperation among states. He argues that espionage allows states to "enjoy
greater certainty that they will be able to validate international compliance, or
at least detect when other participants are failing to comply with the treaty.""
He suggests that espionage allows states involved in complex negotiations to
better understand one another. As a result, espionage "creates a cooperative
opportunity for parties with similar functional interests to negotiate mutually-
beneficial outcomes."88
The justifications proffered by Stone and Baker offer a compelling defense
of espionage under international law; however US law is not so amenable. This
next section briefly discusses the status of national law on the matter.
C. U.S. Law
1. Espionage Act of 1917
Enacted following America's entrance into World War 1," the Espionage
Act of 1917 is a far-reaching statute that Congress devised to address issues
related to interference in U.S. foreign affairs and commerce, in addition to
espionage.90 The Act criminalizes conduct involving the illicit acquisition of
information relating to national security that is intended to either harm the
United States or benefit a foreign nation.9'
According to Herbert Packer, the "legislative trend has been to increase the
scope of these provisions, to provide severer penalties, and to lengthen the time
within which prosecutions may be commenced."9 2 Post-World War II
discoveries of the extent of Soviet espionage efforts against the U.S. during the
war in part prompted that legislative effort.93
The statute's provision on the gathering of defense information describes
various methods of illicit acquisition, namely when an individual "goes upon,
enters, flies over, or otherwise obtains information. . . ."9" The statute's
definition of defense information itself is comprehensive and covers
Id. at 1103.
Id. at 1104.
Id. at 1106.
89 Charles Cheney Hyde, The Espionage Act, 12 AM. J. INT'L. L. 142, 142 (1918).
90 Id.
91 Espionage Act of 1917, 18 U.S.C. §§ 792-799 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
92 Herbert Packer, Offenses Against the State, 339 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
77, 85 (1962).
93 Id. at 85-86.
94 18 U.S.C. § 793 (2006).
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information related to military systems and structures, civil infrastructure, and
many other items of strategic significance to the United States, in addition to
virtually anything connected with "the national defense."" A case brought
under this law for cyber-espionage could fit under the statute's catch-all
"otherwise obtains information" provision. However, given the unique
characteristics of cyber-espionage, an issue regarding the application of U.S.
law abroad arises.
In United States v. Zehe, a district court addressed the extraterritoriality of
the Espionage Act.96 Zehe was an East German national accused of committing
acts of espionage against the United States while in foreign countries. In its
memorandum opinion, the court found that, as espionage is a crime threatening
national security, it "can therefore be punished by Congress even if committed
by a noncitizen outside the United States."" The court noted that the statutory
language did not distinguish between citizens and noncitizens, and that the
crime would probably occur as often outside the United States borders as it
would within." The court also found the removal of the territorial limitation on
the scope of the Act indicative of Congress's intent to have the Act apply
extraterritorially." The value of Zehe is unclear, and as of this Article's
publication, no case involving prosecution for extra-territorial cyber-espionage
under the Espionage Act has taken place or been documented.
2. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") is particularly relevant for
cyber-espionage. The CFAA was first enacted in 1984, at a time when
legislators did not fully grasp the scope of computer crime.'o With regard to
espionage activities, the legislation was crafted so as "not [to] extend liability
beyond existing espionage laws."'o
The Act contains two provisions potentially applicable to cyber-espionage.
The first prohibits accessing without authorization any computer, thereby
acquiring sensitive information, and subsequently disseminating that
information to persons unauthorized to receive it.'02 The second provision
forbids accessing without authorization a US government computer in such a
9 Id. § 793(a)-(b).
96 United States v. Zehe, 601 F. Supp. 196, 197 (D. Mass. 1985).
9 Id. at 198.
9 Id. at 200-01.
99 Id. at 200.1oo Dodd S. Griffith, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986: A Measured Response
to a Growing Problem, 43 VAND. L. REV. 453, 455-56 (1990).
'0' Id. at 462.
102 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) (2006).
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way as to "affect" the use of that computer by the government.0 3 The Act also
grants the Federal Bureau of Investigation primary authority to investigate
crimes under (a)(1) involving espionage, indicating that cyberexploitation was
a focus of the Act.104
There are no indications that the CFAA has been applied extraterritorially.
However, not all acts of cyber-espionage may necessarily be conducted from
abroad, and the placement of a malware-infected flashdrive on an unsecured
computer could yield the same result as an online cyber-espionage operation.'o
Hence, the CFAA may allow the U.S. to prosecute some cyber-espionage, but
only to a limited degree.
Having examined the international and national legal landscapes for
peacetime espionage, the next section analyzes the extent to which the Stone
and Baker justifications of espionage can withstand the continuing evolution of
cyber-espionage.
III. CYBER EFFORTS ABROAD
In the face of these phenomena, many countries are developing cyber-
capabilities to help them detect and neutralize this increasing threat.
A. China and the Koreas
The threat of Chinese cyber-espionage has been a subject of immense
interest to governments and researchers alike.0 6 The Chinese military
established its first cyberwarfare units in 2003,o' though it was not until 2010
that the Chinese unveiled what has been dubbed the "[People's Liberation
Army] cyber command."' The command's purpose is to "address potential
103 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3) (2006).
0 Id. §§ 1030(a)(1), (d)(2).
05 Clay Dillow, Pentagon: 2008 Cyber Breach, Considered the Biggest Ever, Was
Caused By a Simple Flash Drive, POPULAR SCIENCE (Aug. 25, 2010),
http://commcns.org/JNRzPA.
06 STEVEN ADAIR, ET AL., SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD: INVESTIGATING CYBER ESPIONAGE 2.0
(2010), http://commcns.org/JiD614; RONALD DEIBERT, ET AL., TRACKING GHosTNET:
INVESTIGATING A CYBER ESPIONAGE NETWORK 9 (2009), http://commcns.org/Lfy9Hw;
Jeremy Kirk, 'Night Dragon' Attacks from China Strike Energy Companies,
NETWORKWORLD (Feb. 10, 2011), http://commcns.org/LWN3iy; MCAFEE FOUNDSTONE
PROF'L SERVS. & MCAFEE LABS, GLOBAL ENERGY CYBERATTACKS: "NIGHT DRAGON"
(2011), http://commens.org/KDvhSo.
107 JOHN TKACIK, JR., HERITAGE FOUND., TROJAN DRAGON: CHINA'S CY3ER THREAT 2
(2008), www.heritage.org/research/AsiaandthePacific/bg2 106.cfm.
1os L.C. Russell Hsiaso, China's Cyber Command?, CHINA BRIEF (July 22, 2010),
http://commcns.org/Jj7r0q.
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cyber threats and to safeguard China's national security."'" Curiously, the
creation of this command is aimed at strengthening China's ability to defend
its networks from intrusions and attacks.' 0
This claim, though somewhat audacious given China's reputation in this
field, is substantiated at least in part by a recent report conducted by the
Chinese technology development firm Rising. The report indicated that the
United States, Japan, and South Korea bore responsibility for ninety percent of
attacks on Chinese classified networks originating outside the country."' Along
with several related personnel changes in the upper ranks of the Chinese
military, this development suggests that the cyber arena is having more
influence on Chinese military strategy."2
More recently, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger issued calls
for China and the United States to reach what was characterized as "cyber
d6tente" in the face of the tremendous cyber capabilities both countries
possess."' Around this time, it was reported that the People's Liberation
Army's official newspaper called for the acceleration of cyberwar capability
development in the face of growing U.S. military aggression on the Internet."4
A week later, however, Chinese officials spoke in a much less alarmist tone,
claiming that no state of "cyber war" exists between the two countries, adding
that the two governments were not responsible for any hacking against either
country."' Given the tight control China exerts over its media,"' it is unclear
whether such conflicting messages were the result of backtracking or strategic
doublespeak, but regardless of the explanation China will continue to develop
its cyber capabilities to counter any perceived threats.
The Korean peninsula has also featured a cyber element in the midst of
tension between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK). The DPRK's cyber capabilities were in the
spotlight back in 2009 when ROK intelligence officials indicated that the
DPRK had dispatched cyber teams overseas to China to carry out operations,
09 Id.
110 Peng Pu, PLA Unveils Nation's First Cyber Center, GLOBAL TIMES (July 22, 2010),
http://commcns.org/JiD615.
1 Scott Henderson, US # I Perp Attacking China's Classified Networks, THE DARK
VISITOR (Mar. 11, 2011), http://commcns.org/KoyQsP.
112 See Hsiaso, supra note 108.
" Paul Eckert and Daniel Magnowski, Kissinger, Huntsman: U.S., China Need Cyber
Detente, REUTERS (June 14, 2011), http://commcns.org/Jm6cXC.
114 Chris Buckley, China Military Paper Urges Steps Against U.S. Cyber Threat,
REUTERS (June 16, 2011), http://commcns.org/LWN3iB.
"1 Don Durfee, China Says No Cyber Warfare Between It, U.S., THE GLOBE AND MAIL
(June 22, 2011), http://commcns.org/Jj7rgE.
116 ISABELLA BENNETT, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MEDIA CENSORSHIP IN CHINA
(2011), http://commcns.org/JSlq90.
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though there was disagreement as to the veracity of the intelligence apparatus'
claims."'
The following year, the ROK established its own "cyber command" aimed
at defending against cyber threats while simultaneously developing offensive
capabilities for use presumably against the DPRK."' The ROK has also
established various "cybersecurity centers" to help agencies defend against the
threat posed by DPRK hackers, based in part on information from DPRK
defectors."'
B. The Middle East and India-Pakistan
Middle Eastern countries are also bolstering their cyber capabilities, though
not all are doing so in the conventional sense. Israel has significant capabilities
both in terms of offensive attacks as well as infiltration measures, and is even
ranked as the sixth on a list of "cyberwarfare threats" by a U.S. consultancy
firm.'2 0 In addition to having military teams allocated to this field, the Israelis
announced the creation of their own "cyber command" aimed at defending
"critical computer systems.""' There is widespread speculation that Israel may
have been responsible for the development of Stuxnet, though no dispositive
proof has been produced.
Iran has bolstered its capabilities in this area in the aftermath of the Stuxnet
affair. The Iranians responded by undertaking a massive recruitment effort for
a cyberwar force, which serves within the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.'22
Despite Iranian rhetoric suggesting sophisticated abilities, much of their efforts
in this area appear to be focused on taking down opposition websites and blogs
that are critical of the current government.'2 3 However, in June of 2011 an
Iranian military official discussed the country's efforts in developing a cyber
command to counter what it sees as growing Western incursions into its
117 Jung Hyo-sik, North Korea Fingered in Cyber Attack, KOREA JOONGANG DAILY (July
11, 2009), http://commcns.org/LWN3iC.
" LLD and AEF, Chinese Cyber Army Shows its True Face, Secrets of U.S., Japan, and
Korea's Cyber Armies Revealed, BEIJING DAILY (May 29, 2011),
http://commcns.org/JNRzPB (translation of original article provided by ChinaScope).
9 Sangwon Yoon, Is the Inter-Korean Conflict Going Cyber?, AL JAZEERA (June 24,
2011), http://commcns.org/JOEolF.
120 Dan Williams, Spymaster Sees Israel as World Cyberwar Leader, REUTERS (Dec. 15,
2009), http://commcns.org/KoyQsR.
121 Calev Ben-David, Israel to Establish Command Center for Cyber Threat Defense,
BLOOMBERG (May 18, 2011), http://commcns.org/JylNrE.
122 Kevin Fogarty, Iran Responds to Stuxnet by Expanding Cyberwar Militia, IT WORLD
(Jan. 12, 2011), http://commcns.org/KbLony.
123 Nasser Karimi, Report: Iran's Paramilitary Launches Cyber Attack, WASH. POST,
Mar. 14, 2011, http://commcns.org/MobuYS.
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political sovereignty, what it deems "soft warfare." 24
Syria has also made strides in developing offensive cyber capabilities, but
those capabilities appear focused on attacking foreign websites and cracking
down on domestic dissidents in the wake of the Arab Spring.'" Additionally,
Turkey has undergone cyberattack drills aimed at assessing the government's
ability to respond to such threats. 2 6
Meanwhile, cyber threats against India have led the country to begin
developing its own Cyber Command & Control Authority.'27 The centralized
organ was deemed necessary, as ad-hoc responses by individual agencies were
seen as ineffective in countering attacks and intrusions into government
systems.'2 8 The most recent cyber spats involved hackers located in India
attacking Pakistani websites, ostensibly in remembrance of the victims of the
Mumbai terrorist attacks of 2008, but that is arguably part of a larger
underlying tension between the two countries. 2 9 India has also increasingly
cooperated with the United States on cybersecurity issues, with the goal of
developing a peaceful and secure Internet.'30
Not much is known of Pakistan's cyber capabilities. Though India has been
engaged with Pakistan in cyber conflict, it has largely consisted of vandalism
of various websites and efforts to control other sites.'' However, in May 2011,
the Hindustan Times reported that an officer of the Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI), Pakistan's intelligence service, hacked into an Indian Army major's
email account and in the process secured "many sensitive documents." 3 2
Compounding the severity of the breach was that the victim had secret and top
secret documents that he was not authorized to access, multiplying the
potential intelligence coup for the ISI."
124 Iran to Boost Soft Power Through Establishing New Cyber Command, FARS NEWS
AGENCY (June 15, 2011), http://commcns.org/JNRzPD.
125 Helmi Noman, The Emergence of Open and Organized Pro-Government Cyber
Attacks in the Middle East: The Case of the Syrian Electronic Army, INFOWAR MONITOR
(May 30, 2011), http://commcns.org/Ja6dmG.
12 Turkey to Conduct Cyber Attack Drills, TODAY'S ZAMAN (Jan. 21, 2011),
http://commcns.org/JLfyQm.
27 Harish Gupta, As Cyber Attacks Rise, India Sets Up Central Command to Fight Back,
DAILY NEWS & ANALYSIS (May 15, 2011), http://commcns.org/Jm6cXF.
128 id.128
129 Jahanzaib Haque, Cyber Warfare: Indian Hackers Take Down 36 Gov't Websites, THE
EXPRESS TRIBUNE (Dec. 1, 2010), http://commcns.org/JSlsia.
130 Close Cooperation with India on Cyber Security Issues: US, THE ECONOMIC TIMES
(May 19, 2011), http://commcns.org/Lau94G.
'3 Sandeep Unnithan, Inside the Indo-Pak Cyber Wars, INDIA TODAY (Mar. 18, 2011),
http://commcns.org/Ja6dmJ.
32 Sanjib Kr Baruah, ISI Major Hacked Army Officer's Mail, HINDUSTAN TIMES (May
16, 2011), http://commens.org/L3IsXX.
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C. Russia and Europe
Information on Russia's cyber-espionage institutions and doctrines is scant.
Russia and the US are equally active in cyber intelligence gathering from the
other, as well as keeping those cyber capabilities obscured."' Russia is
estimated to spend approximately $127 million on its cyberwarfare programs,
with a force size of more than 7,300 personnel.'3 ' The Federal Protection
Service is chiefly responsible for the gathering of signals intelligence, though
the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and Military Intelligence (GRU) play a
role in this area as well."' Russia's precise capabilities in terms of cyber-
espionage are also unclear, but two incidents reveal a certain level of
sophistication.
During the weeks prior to the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008, Russian
hackers engaged in "information exfiltration activities conducted to
accumulate military and political intelligence from Georgian networks."3 7 The
intelligence gathering conducted by the hackers represented a complex and
highly coordinated operation, and illustrates the blurring of the lines between
routine cyber-espionage and espionage as a precursor to cyber and
conventional warfare."'
The following year Russian "hacktivists" were accused of orchestrating an
intrusion into the computer systems of the University of East Anglia's Climatic
Research Unit and subsequently leaking thousands of emails incriminating
scientists in a data manipulation scandal.'3 ' No firm link between the act and
the Russian government was established. The selection of emails and
complexity of the data in question led to speculation that the incident was not
one conducted by average computer hackers but likely involved in some
capacity Russian intelligence.'4 0 If the accusations are well-founded, this
incident indicates Russia's willingness to use cyber-espionage as a means of
influencing policy at the international level.
European nations have also been spurred to act in the face of this evolving
" FRANZ-STEFAN GADY AND GREG AUSTIN, EASTWEST INSTITUTE RUSSIA, THE UNITED
STATES, AND CYBER DIPLOMACY - OPENING THE DOORS 1 (2010),
htt://commcns.org/KDvkNP.
Kevin Coleman, Russia 's Cyber Forces, DEFENSE TECH (May 27, 2008),
http://commcns.org/LWN5qs.
ROLAND HEICKERO, SWEDISH DEFENCE RESEARCH AGENCY EMERGING CYBER THREATS
AND RUSSIAN VIEWS ON INFORMATION WARFARE AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS, 28, 34
(2010), http://commcns.org/KoyQsS.
1 David Hollis, Cyber Case Study: Georgia 2008, SMALL WARS JOURNAL 3 (Jan. 6,
2011), http://commcns.org/Kw5a0L.
138 Id.
'3 Shaun Walker, Was Russian Secret Service Behind Leak of Climate-Change Emails?,
THE INDEPENDENT (Dec. 7, 2009), http://commcns.org/L31sYO.
140 Id
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threat. In 2009, the United Kingdom's government created two organizations,
the Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) and the Office of Cyber
Security (OCS), which are tasked with analyzing trends in cyberspace and
working on preventing threats against British systems. 4 ' Some reports
indicated that the OCS would have offensive capabilities, including "exploiting
opportunities in cyber space,"' though officials did not explain what that
meant in greater detail.'4 3
In 2009, France formed the French Network and Information Security
Agency ("FNISA") to safeguard government information systems and react to
cyber threats." FNISA resides under the authority of the General Secretary for
National Defense, though the agency also plays a role working with the private
sector in keeping it abreast of security threats.'45
Germany, in response to numerous incursions into its systems-over 1600
cyber attacks in 2010 alone-established its own National Cyber Defense
Center ("NCDC") in Bonn in June 2011 .' With the creation of the NCDC, the
newly appointed Interior Minister referred to cyber security as "a central
issue."l4 The NCDC actually comprises many agencies working together to
defend against cyber threats.1'
The Swiss are developing an outfit for Computer Network Operations
within their existing Centre for Electronic Operations of the Armed Forces
Command Support Organisation ("CEO").'4 Swiss legal opinions preclude the
use of Computer Network Exploitation for any purpose other than defensive
measures, though the CEO plans to fully develop attack and exploitation
capabilities."'
At the intergovernmental level, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) has also taken steps to develop cyberwarfare defense, including the
creation of the Cooperative Cyber Defence Center for Excellence, the mission
141 ALEX MICHAEL, DEFENSE ACADEMY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, CYBER PROBING: THE
POLITICISATION OF VIRTUAL ATTACK 20 (2010), http://commcns.org/KjfP12.
142 UK OFFICE OF CYBER SECURITY, CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
15 2009), http://commcns.org/LauaWl.
Tom Espiner, U.K Cybersecurity Office to Have Attack Role, CNET (June 25, 2009),
http://commcns.org/LfyaLu.
' MISSION-AGENCE NATIONALE DE LA SECURITE DES SYSTtMES D'lNFORMATION,
http://commcns.org/JylQnk.
45 Peter Sayer, France Creates New National IT Security Agency, CIO (July 10, 2009),
http://commcns.org/Jj7s4m.
46 Sebastian Fischer and Ole Reissmann, Germany Arms Itself for Cyber War, SPIEGEL
ONLINE (June 16, 2011), http://commcns.org/JyYyiS.
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148 Filippa von Stackelberg, Germany Prepares for Cyber War, NEW SECURITY
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149 Cavelty, supra note 17, at 3.
150 Id.
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of which is to "enhance the capability, cooperation and information sharing
among NATO, NATO nations and Partners . . . ."' Another NATO
organization, the Cyber Defence Management Authority, is tasked with
"coordinating cyber defence across the Alliance," and operates under the
authority of the NATO Consultation, Control and Command Board. 15 2 The
extent to which these organizations are equipping NATO countries to conduct
cyber-espionage or other activities is unclear, though defending against cyber-
espionage will likely factor into their efforts.
IV. UNIQUE ASPECTS PRESENTED BY CYBER
Unlike the political atmosphere of the Cold War, the current international
climate is not one dominated by two superpowers with an arsenal of nuclear
weapons poised for global annihilation. Rather, the means and modes of
wreaking havoc are in many hands.' With human rights abuses and political
revolutions coming into greater importance for foreign policy, access to
reliable intelligence through a variety of means is increasingly necessary.
Indeed, information pertaining to allies and adversaries is even more crucial in
today's environment.
Espionage-and in particular cyber-espionage-is a balance of trade-offs.
States have a vested interest in having as much reliable information as possible
at their disposal. That information comes at a cost, however, whether in
manpower, treasure, or the potential loss of amicable relations with fellow
countries. No doubt Stone and Baker raise compelling arguments supporting
the merits of espionage, in particular as it benefits international security and
cooperation. But the calculus for the espionage trade-offs is altered when it
takes place in the cyber domain, and whether Stone's and Baker's constructs of
espionage can withstand the changes presented is another matter.'54 There has
151 NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE, Mission and Vision,
http://commcns.org/Kw5aON.
2 JEFFREY HUNKER, CYBER WAR AND CYBER POWER - ISSUES FOR NATO DOCTRINE 8, 9
(2010), http://commcns.org/LfyaLx.
153 John J. Kruzel, Cybersecurity Poses Unprecedented Challenge to National Security,
Lynn Says, AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE (June 15, 2009), http://commcns.org/Jm6cXG
("'Once the province of nations, the ability to destroy via cyber means now also rests in the
hands of small groups and individuals: from terrorist groups to organized crime, hackers to
industrial spies to foreign intelligence services,' [Deputy Secretary of Defense William
Lynn] told the Center for Strategic and International Studies here."). See also COMMISSION
ON THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM,
PREVENTION OF WMD PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM REPORT CARD (2010),
http://commcns.org/JNRzPI.
54 Major Arie J. Schaap argues that despite the changes cyber presents, "at its core, it is
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attempting to establish lawful or unlawful activities under international law." Major Arie J.
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been little scholarship on the evolution of technology and its effect on the
legality of peacetime espionage. Stone and Baker thus provide a stepping stone
to analyze the issues presented by cyber-espionage.
At the time Stone made his assertion, the technological frontier for
espionage involved satellites, specialized aircraft and sea vessels, all of which
could collect intelligence without ever crossing into the territory of another
country.' He also noted, with respect to the issues raised by space technology,
that "territorial sovereignty in the old sense of full psychological sacrosanctity
is no longer with us.""' His forecast proved accurate, as the technical means
put into use rapidly evolved throughout the Cold War and proved a useful
means for the United States to acquire intelligence."
Cyber-espionage exponentially increases those changes contemplated by
Stone. The 1960 U-2 crisis was a relatively straightforward situation involving
a US aircraft breaching the territorial sovereignty of the USSR, albeit for
reconnaissance purposes only. The flights were motivated by a desire to
respond to significant espionage effort put forth by the Soviets, who utilized
both an extensive personnel network in the United States, as well as their
nascent but effective satellite reconnaissance capabilities."' The flights were
further justified on the grounds that they were not armed and therefore not
provocative in nature."' Despite these considerations, their revelation still
caused a massive international crisis.
The U-2 over-flights also revealed that the Soviet Union's military was
much weaker than previously suggested.'6 0 This knowledge arguably
contributed more to stability than did reliance on less accurate means of
intelligence. This is consonant with "Eisenhower's dictum that intelligence on
'what the Soviets did not have' was often as important as information on what
they did."16'
Furthermore, the frontier of what Stone referred to when speaking of
espionage that would require no collateral illegality is very nearly reached with
cyber-espionage. It can be done from anywhere and often through surreptitious
Schaap, Cyberlaw Edition: Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use Under
International Law, 64 A.F. L. REV. 121, 141 (2009).
1 Stone, supra note 72, at 37, 43.
'16 Id. at 36.
1 Kristie Macrakis, Technophilic Hubris and Espionage Styles During the Cold War,
101 Isis 378, 378 (2010).
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159 Id at 99.
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means. This method avoids the risks accompanied by in-person espionage or
aerial over-flights.
Personnel are often put in harm's way with traditional forms of espionage,
whether they are on the ground clandestinely, flying high above in an aircraft,
or within foreign territory conducting maritime surveillance. With cyber-
espionage, the "spy" can operate from the relative safety of his or her home
country, using technology as the means of acquiring intelligence.'62 If the
means employed work as intended, the spied-upon target won't know anything
is amiss; if they malfunction or otherwise fail the risk of harm to the "spy" or
host state is relatively minimal.
As the examples of cyber-espionage in Section I demonstrate, the acts are
often traced back to servers in foreign countries-meaning the act of gathering
this information is occurring outside of the target states.'6 3 Additionally, an
intrusion traced to a server in a particular country may nonetheless have been
committed by another country, either through technical means such as
routingl6 4 or by physically conducting an incursion from that particular
country.'65 These measures, though not necessarily immune from investigation
and attribution, can make those tasks much more difficult for the target state,
as well as host countries.'6 6
Moreover, Stone's "green light espionage" can be much more problematic
in the cyber realm. Lieutenant Commander Paul Walker discusses the use of
"positioning of forces" in conventional warfare as a means of achieving
strategic surprise over an adversary, and explains how that concept translates
into the cyber realm.'67 Walker identifies two components of force positioning
in cyberspace: 1) "exploit a vulnerability in the system in order to get inside
the system" and 2) "information-based action" from within the system to
facilitate broader action.'
Examples of this second prong could include "altering data, destroying data,
162 Wolfgang McGavran, Intended Consequences: Regulating Cyber Attacks, 12 TuL. J.
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sending false messages, or causing systems to malfunction or stop working."'"
Walker further observes that positioning in the cyber context "will often
involve peacetime access, either through remote or close means, in preparation
for later actions during hostilities."'
This ambiguity is not too different from what the Soviets faced with the U-2
over-flights, or even the traditional conduct of espionage involving persons
instead of technology. The aforementioned discussion between US and Soviet
diplomats regarding the differences between spy planes potentially armed with
weaponry and "secret agents" equipped with explosive charges demonstrates
this parallel. One could point to the dual-payload pieces of code discussed by
Lin and find that a threshold has been crossed, that cyber is different than
anything previously encountered. After all, with some sophisticated malware,
one country could secure battle plans, infrastructure schematics, and other
sensitive material from an adversary, all as a prelude to a massive attack.
Such a claim is too attenuated, despite the potential for significant harm that
could result from offensive cyber measures directed at the United States. While
it is true that the concerns raised by Stone regarding the distinction between
green light espionage and red light espionage are amplified in the cyber realm,
those concerns persist with the other forms of espionage previously discussed.
Spies infiltrating the country and hiding in plain sight working for sensitive
facilities can commit sabotage and wreak havoc. Surveillance aircraft and
reconnaissance satellites could be equipped with volatile weapons to deploy
and deceive the surveilled until it is too late. Yet espionage by those means
persists and the international community appears to tolerate it.
Based on those analogies, cyber-espionage should not be treated any
differently. The benefits to international stability and cooperation as outlined
by Stone and Baker are as relevant today as they ever have been. The altered
calculus can be viewed in two ways-as making the threat of harmful cyber-
attacks much more real, and as increasing the ease by which countries can
ascertain one another's intentions and activities. To the extent that the former
threat exists, the benefits offered by the latter far exceed it.
Thus, cyber-espionage, like other forms of espionage, should persist
unabated. States should respond to it as they do any other attempts to acquire
sensitive information: making best efforts to secure that information, and when
possible, to pursue elements operating within their territory who are facilitating
the conduct of cyber-espionage. But in spite of the increased use of cyber-
espionage by many states, there are proposals that seek to limit its scope or use
169 Id. at 350.170 id.
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altogether.
The following section examines some of these proposals and analyzes their
relative merits.
V. HOW THE U.S. CAN RESPOND
A. Continued Application of Existing Law
The Espionage Act and, more directly, the CFAA provide the legal basis to
prosecute instances of cyber-espionage. However, there has been a dearth of
prosecutions under these laws despite the sheer number of attacks against US
government systems."' Even if the current law was suitable for prosecuting
instances of cyber-espionage, intelligence agencies must confront another
critical issue in responding to the espionage-whether to track and gain more
information about those activities, or to arrest and prosecute, and thereby close
a potential source of information."'
B. Development of New Law to Account For Differences in the Cyber Realm
1. Cyber Espionage Act
One proposal calls for Congress to pass a Cyber Espionage Act (CEA),
which would "criminalize acts of hacking intended to disrupt American
economic or military computer infrastructure, military secrets, or trade
secrets.""' The scope of the CEA would be limited to acts that are done for the
benefit of foreign governments, and intrusions originating outside the United
States would fall under the jurisdiction of the Pentagon "or a related agency." 74
The CEA is premised on the idea that, although 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) already
criminalizes these types of acts, it is somehow ineffective in combating the
increasing threat of cyber-espionage."' The author claims that the CEA serves
three critical needs: first, it would allow prosecutors to go after hackers located
in the US who are operating on behalf or in support of foreign governments;
7 contacted the Office of Intergovernmental and Public Liaison for assistance in
researching this information as my personal efforts have netted few results. For instance, the
Cybercrime Page for the DOJ has very few prosecutions involving the espionage provision.
172 Frontline: From China With Love-Interview: Edward Appel,
http://commcns.org/JiD6hr (former FBI Special Agent discussing issues counter-intelligence
officers confront in tackling espionage).
173 Jonathan Eric Lewis, The Economic Espionage Act and the Threat of Chinese
Espionage in the United States, 8 CHI. KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 189, 231-32 (2009).
174 Id. at 232.
17 Id at 232-33.
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second, it would be a wake-up call to the Chinese that the United States takes
the threat seriously and will respond, by prosecution if possible; and third, the
CEA would impose stiffer penalties than those currently provided for in
section 1030."'
Given that the CFAA has been largely inadequate for addressing acts of
cyber-espionage committed from outside the territory of the United States, the
advantage to be gained by passing the CEA is unclear. To the extent that
foreign nationals are conducting cyber-espionage within US borders, the
CFAA and or Espionage Act may presumably be utilized. Otherwise this
proposal would amount to little more than political posturing.
C. Non-Judicial or Countermeasure Responses
1. Diplomatic Efforts and Information Sharing
Another proposal in the context of economic cyber-espionage has been to
exercise diplomatic power in an effort to stem espionage. Aaron Burnstein has
suggested that in order to foster an atmosphere of measured trust and
transparency, nation states could informally exchange information as to what
scientific and technological projects each respective country is funding and the
amount of resources being devoted to those projects."' The exchange of this
information would promote transparency by allowing countries to verify, to
some extent, that technological developments in those countries are "not cast
under suspicions raised by economic espionage prosecutions in the United
States.""'
The proposal is not without flaws, as Burnstein acknowledges, with the most
obvious one being that countries are likely unwilling to share any sensitive
information with other countries. 9 He nonetheless points to current practices
of information sharing among countries as a foundation upon which some
future exchange could take place.' Regardless of whatever information is
willingly shared, countries will always seek to access more, and through
whatever means available.
If the United States is particularly troubled by an act of cyber-espionage by
another country, it may still utilize many of the other tools in its possession.
"' Id. at 232-34.
177 Aaron J. Burnstein, Trade Secrecy as an Instrument of National Security? Rethinking
the Foundations ofEconomic Espionage, 41 ARIz. ST. L.J. 933, 986-87 (2009).
178 Id. at 987.
n79 Id.
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Given the prevalence of espionage in its multitude of forms'"' and the adept
nature of counterintelligence services, it is probable that the FBI could make an
arrest under preexisting laws, or deport an operative already under
surveillance, as retaliation for the cyber activities of the respective country. 82
Alternatively, the United States government could apply diplomatic pressure in
a completely unrelated area as "soft retaliation" for the perceived wrongdoing.
The United States could also take a more direct approach and publicly out
espionage-committing countries like China for their activities, as the Atlantic
Council's Jason Healey suggests. 83 These responses assume that the culprit
could be readily identified.
2. Counter-Espionage
Another option available to the United States, and one it in all likelihood
already engages in, is reciprocal espionage.'84 As discussed above, espionage in
many respects is the practice of nation states. Under Executive Order 12333,
the National Security Agency (NSA) is tasked with the collection of "signals
intelligence information and data" and is thus the primary apparatus through
which the United States engages in its cyber-espionage.' In addition to
preexisting activities, the NSA could probe the suspected country's computer
systems as a means of responding to the conduct. Yet, depending on the nature
of the information accessed, the identity of the suspected country (if the
conduct can be attributed to a country), as well as other factors, no response or
a very subtle response may be more appropriate than any sort of blatant
reaction. The chosen response will likely depend on the message desired to be
sent, if any.
D. Assessment of Options
Despite the relative merits and drawbacks of the aforementioned measures,
Bill Gertz, Inside the Ring: Counterspies Hunt Russian Mole Inside National Security
Agency, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2010, http://commcns.org/LWN5qu.
182 There is precedent for the latter option, as was seen during Operation Famish, in which
the United States rolled up an extensive network of Soviet spies operating in the US under
diplomatic cover. Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. Expels 25 Soviet Diplomats; Denies Link With
DaniloffAffair, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 18, 1986, at Al.
183 Philip Ewing, Has the 'Cyber Pearl Harbor' Already Happened?, DoD Buzz (Mar.
26, 2012), http://commcns.org/LauaWn.
A statement by Michael Hayden suggests this is the case. Kim Zetter, Former NSA
Director: Countries Spewing Cyberattacks Should Be Held Responsible, WIRED (July 29,
2010), http://commcns.org/JNRA5W ("[w]ithout going into great detail, we're actually
prett good at [cyber-espionage], and the Chinese aren't the only ones doing this.").
Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59947 (Dec. 4, 1981).
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none of them individually or even taken together will prevent cyber-espionage
or encourage states to cease carrying it out. Moreover, many of these proposals
are in tension with one another. The proposed CEA, were it able to yield some
success at stemming espionage, would likely inspire similar laws in other
countries and those nations would make best efforts to intercept and prosecute
U.S. "cyber spies." In all likelihood, the CEA or a similar piece of legislation
would duplicate existing federal law and do little to address persistent cyber-
espionage conduct.
An information sharing proposal similar to the one suggested by Burnstein
would probably not be accepted. It is in every country's interest to preserve the
integrity of information systems and the sensitive data they contain. Despite
sharing that countries do for strategic and cooperative purposes, when this is
done, it is done voluntarily (and therefore selectively). In the case of actual
intelligence data, the information is likely sanitized, to avoid revealing the
sources and methods of its collection. This is all the more true in the wake of
the Wikileaks-State Department scandal in 2010, in which thousands of
sensitive communiqu6s and documents were placed on the Internet.' No
matter the value of the norms that may develop in terms of international
cooperation or transparency, states will continue to engage in cyber-espionage.
Although an outright information-exchange regime may not be too likely in
the near-term, there is cause for hope. The governments of the United States
and Russia are making efforts to ensure open channels of communication exist
so as to prevent potentially harmful consequences resulting from the
misreading of an incident.' Such arrangements could allow for states to
continue intelligence gathering activities while averting a potentially hostile
response.
Reciprocal espionage likely does nothing to stop ongoing espionage
committed against the United States. As demonstrated above, one difficulty of
cyber-espionage is that it offers all of the benefits of traditional espionage
(arguably more so, given the sheer amount of information that can be collected
in a relatively short period of time) with few of the consequences attendant
with "traditional modes" of intelligence collection. If countries can engage in
this type of behavior with impunity, cyber-espionage is unlikely to abate in the
future.
186 Kim Zetter, Former NSA Director: Countries Spewing Cyberattacks Should Be Held
Reseonsible, WIRED (July 29, 2010), http://commcns.org/JNRA5W.
Nate Anderson, US and Russia "Reset" Their Cybersecurity Relationship, ARS
TECHNICA (July 13, 2011), http://commens.org/Kil8pG.
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VI. CONCLUSION
One principle that should inform any response in this area is that espionage,
cyber or otherwise, serves valuable purposes for nation states.'" The costs of
losing sensitive information or strategic advantages are certainly great, but
having access to such information from one's adversaries is crucial to
effectively operating in the international community. Because of this value,
calls for haphazard action at the international level for "moratoriums" on
cyber-espionage should be resisted. Efforts should focus on countermeasures,
capabilities, and open lines of communication to thwart potential escalations
through misunderstandings.
Cyber-espionage by its nature has fewer safeguards for the surveilled states
than traditional forms of espionage. As Lin suggests, this can put states in a
tense position when ascertaining the threat and identifying potential
responses.' If the United States seeks to reduce the pervasiveness of cyber-
espionage, it should focus on making its computer networks less attractive a
target, thereby forcing its counterparts to engage in alternative collection
measures that allow for more effective enforcement.
188 Glenn Sulmasy and John Yoo, Counterintuitive: Intelligence Operations and
International Law, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 625, 634 (2007) (claiming intelligence can "promote
the potential for peace and reduce international tension); Scott, supra note 56, at 225-26
(claiming intelligence gathering for "self-defense" purposes can help prevent armed
attacks).
189 Lin, supra note 14, at 84.
[Vol. 20390
